We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure marketwide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental con ‡ict of interest between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Consumers prefer standardization with full compatibility because it o¤ers more variety that confers a better match with their ideal speci…cations. However, …rms are likely to choose the minimal compatibility to maximize product di¤erentiation and soften competition. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature that shows the alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility.
Introduction
This paper reexamines the incentives for …rms to achieve standardization that ensures market-wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. To analyze such an issue, we consider a systems market comprised of two complementary products to be used on a one-to-one basis. We construct a "torus" model to represent twodimensional spatial competition. The torus model allows characterization of a symmetric equilibrium with more than two …rms, as the circular city model does in a one dimensional product space. We develop a novel approach to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental con ‡ict of interest between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Consumers prefer standardization with full compatibility because it o¤ers more variety that confers a better match with their ideal speci…cations. However, …rms are likely to choose the minimal compatibility to maximize product di¤erentiation and soften competition. This is in sharp contrast to the previous literature that shows the alignment of private and social incentives for compatibility [Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) ].
Consider a situation in which all …rms in the market are integrated in the sense that they produce both component products. One important decision for them is whether or not to make their components compatible with those of their rivals. In the case of the home audio industry, for instance, full industry-wide compatibility prevails, which allows consumers to combine a receiver of any brand with speakers of any other brands. In the smartphone industry, however, we have incompatibility in the sense that any "apps" developed for the Android operating system cannot be used for any phone based on iOS, the operating system developed by Apple, and vice versa. 1 The issue of compatibility choice has been studied extensively. The literature on this has addressed two main questions: Do …rms have incentives to achieve compatibility across components made by di¤erent producers? Is the market compatibility choice socially optimal? Major contributors on this subject, in particular Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) , answered positively to both questions, demonstrating the align- 1 System markets are often characterized by indirect network e¤ects or inter-group network externalities. Implications of network e¤ects in this set-up has been extensively analyzed in the framework of two-sided markets (see, for instance, Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) ). In this paper, we analyze incentives to maintain product compatibility in the absence of network externalities to isolate the e¤ects of compatibility on competitive pricing. This also facilitates comparison of our results to the existing literature pioneered by Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) . ment of private and social incentives for compatibility in the absence of network e¤ects.
In particular, Matutes and Regibeau (1988) consider a two-stage game in which two fully integrated …rms make their compatibility decisions prior to competition in prices. They show that the equilibrium entails full compatibility between component products of the two rival …rms because compatibility leads to higher prices than incompatibility. Compatibility also leads to higher social welfare due to the increased variety of systems available. Economides (1989) extends Matutes and Regibeau's analysis by considering a more general case of n( 2) …rms. He recon…rms that compatibility prevails in equilibrium, because compatibility leads to higher prices and pro…ts than incompatibility. However, as we explain below, Economides'conclusion is based on an inconsistent analysis, which we intend to rectify in this paper. To this end, we develop a torus model that allows more than two …rms to be located symmetrically. We demonstrate that Matutes and Regibeau's results are limited to the special case of two …rms and not robust to changes in the number of …rms, overturning the conclusion of Economides (1989) .
To analyze the desirability of compatibility across di¤erent producers of each component products, we adopt the framework of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) to facilitate the comparison of results. However, we modify it to maintain symmetry across system products in a more general case with more than 2 varieties for each component. More precisely, we consider a system good market which consists of two di¤erentiated component goods, called A and B, such as hardware and software. 2 We search for symmetric equilibria with n producers in each of the two di¤erentiated component-markets. The distribution of consumers'preference is modeled as a uniform distribution on a torus, the Cartesian product of two circles.
With a general number of …rms in the market, we need to deal with a large number of compatibility possibilities across the two components and location choices for each system variety. In this paper, we focus on two polar cases. Compatibility is the case where any component in market A is compatible with any component in market B: For instance, this may be an outcome of industry-wide standardization e¤orts that ensures interoperability between any components that adhere to the industry standard. The other case we consider is the minimum level of compatibility in which one particular variety of component A is compatible with only one variety of component B, and vice versa. We call this regime 2 See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a discussion of economic issues in systems markets.
incompatibility under which no mix-and-match is possible. We consider two alternative market structures, one in which all …rms are vertically integrated multi-product …rms that produce both components, and one in which each …rm is vertically separated and produces only one component. In the integrated …rm case, incompatibility would arise if each …rm produces a closed system. In the vertically separated …rm case, this would arise if each …rm has a proprietary technology and …rms in market A form an exclusive partnership with partner …rms in market B.
We show that for all n 4, …rms prefer incompatibility to compatibility in the integrated …rm case (whereas the same holds for n 3 in the vertically separated …rm case). 3 In contrast, social welfare is maximized under compatibility. This implies that the alignment of private and social incentives towards compatibility in Matutes and Regibeau is a special result that applies to only n = 2, and is not robust to changes in the number of …rms.
The logic behind our results is simple and can be explained in geometric terms. First, under compatibility there are n 2 systems available while there are only n systems available under incompatibility. As a result, it is more costly for an individual consumer to change his choice under incompatibility because the second best alternative tends to be farther away from his ideal speci…cation than in the compatibility regime. Second, the measure of marginal consumers (those who are indi¤erent between two alternatives) is usually smaller under incompatibility. This implies that the marginal gains from a price cut, or equivalently the …rms'price cutting incentives, are smaller. Taken together, …rms have incentives to produce closed systems or engage in exclusive partnerships that result in incompatibility in order to reduce the intensity of price competition. In particular, we make a novel methodological innovation that provides a clean characterization of the dependence of price competition on the location of competing products in a two-dimensional product space. We show that the intensity of price competition in the market is completely characterized by and is inversely related to a simple parameter called the m-to-d ratio, which is a ratio of the measure of marginal consumers to the extent of product di¤erentiation. This parameter operationalizes the notion of the principle of maximum di¤ erentiation in a two dimensional product space. On the other hand, as is well-understood in the literature, compatibility is desirable for the consumers and for the whole economy since it reduces consumers'"transportation costs" by increasing the variety of systems available in the market.
It is worth mentioning that Economides (1989) analyzed essentially the same problem we are considering in this paper. His analysis, however, was logically inconsistent by implicitly considering two topologically di¤erent manifolds to represent the same market -sphere and torus -when he compared two di¤erent regimes. 4 More speci…cally, he assumed on one hand that consumers are uniformly distributed on a surface of a sphere that has a great circle of length 1 (p.1167). On the other hand, he represented the market on a two-dimensional plane (see Figure 1 in p.1169 of the paper) which is topologically equivalent (or homeomorphic)
to a torus (Cartesian product of two circles) but not to a sphere. 5 The analysis of the equilibrium under compatibility (Section II) was based on the assumption that the market can be represented as the two-dimensional plane. In the analysis of the equilibrium under incompatibility (Section III), however, he assumed a sphere market: whereas the distance between any two neighboring systems appears to be p 2d in the two-dimensional plane (see Figure 1 ), that distance is taken as d (as opposed to p 2d) in the analysis in Section III.
This would be the case on the surface of the sphere where the length of a diagonal circle is the same with that of a horizontal circle or a vertical circle. But that is not the case in the plane representation.
Even if we ignored this technical problem, Economides's analysis would still appear problematic, because as shown in this paper, how the products are located on the characteristics space matters. Without an inquiry of whether the equilibrium pro…ts would depend on the locations of the products, he simply assumed that the system goods are located on the diagonal. The comparison under this locational formation of the products may not be fair. For the compatibility case there is no other formation that enhances the equilibrium pro…ts, but for the incompatibility case there is. As a result, he mistakenly concluded that the Matutes and Regibeau result extends for the general n …rm case, with private and social incentives aligned. In contrast, we show in this paper that …rms may prefer incompatibility, because under incompatibility they can increase pro…ts by di¤erentiating their products from others.
Our paper mainly contributes to the literature on spatial competition models of com- 4 We are not the …rst one to notice this error. Matutues and Regibeau (1991) and Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner (1998) also point out the error, but do not pursue the matter further. 5 For an explanation about homeomorphic relations among two-dimensional manifolds, we refer interested readers to Massey (1991). patibility, but also relates to other branches of research including products bundling (e.g. Matutes and Regibeau (1992) , Chen (1997) , Choi (1996) , Denicolo (2000) and Nalebu¤ (2004)), exclusive dealing (e.g. Besanko and Perry (1994) ) and vertical organization of industry in general (Farrell et al. (1998) ). In our analysis, we consider two alternative market structures. One is where all …rms are integrated in the sense that they produce both components of the system. The other case is where all …rms produce only one component. Depending on the market structure, our model can also be reinterpreted as an analysis of the incentives for …rms to engage in bundling or exclusive dealing arrangements.
In the integrated …rm case, the e¤ect of incompatibility is equivalent to that of bundling in that consumers are forced to buy the whole system from the same vendor. In the onecomponent producer case, incompatibility is equivalent to exclusive dealing between a pair of partner …rms. For instance, if we reinterpret two component products as a …nal good and retailing service, respectively, our model can be considered as an analysis of incentives for exclusive dealing contracts. In this context, our paper also provides a useful framework to analyze incentives to engage in bundling decisions or exclusive dealing arrangements in system markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model of di¤erentiated system products in a toroidal two dimensional product space. In section 3, we …rst consider integrated …rms that produce both components. We analyze market equilibria in two regimes, incompatibility without any mix-and-match possibility, and full compatibility enabled by market-wide standardization. We derive the market equilibrium in each regime and analyze incentives to achieve standardization in the market. We show that under full compatibility, the market equilibrium in each component market can be analyzed in isolation of the other component market. As a result, the market equilibrium replicates the one in the classical circular city model. We also characterize the equilibrium of price competition under any symmetric con…guration of product di¤erentiation, which allows the comparison of equilibrium pro…ts under compatibility and under incompatibility.
The analysis reveals a fundamental con ‡ict of interest between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Section 4 contains a discussion about an alternative market structure in which each …rm produces only one component as a robustness check of our main results. Concluding remarks follow. 
The Model
Consider a market for system goods that consist of two component products, A and B. We assume that these two component products can generate value only when they are combined together. To analyze the incentives to achieve compatibility between the two components, we adopt a variation of Matutes and Regibeau (1988) that accommodates more than 2 varieties in each component market while maintaining symmetry among varieties. There are n ( 2) …rms, each of which produces the two components of a system, i.e., a single variety of component A and a single variety of component B. 6 To maintain symmetry, we adopt a torus to represent the product space. Consumers have heterogenous preferences over the characteristics of each component. Each consumer's preference is summarized by her location which represents her ideal variety (x A , x B ) in the product space. The torus is constructed by the following equivalence relations over R 2 .
As shown in Figure 1 , the torus is homeomorphic to the Cartesian product of two circles, i.e. S 1 S 1 , thus is a natural two-dimensional extension of the circular city model à la
Salop (1979).
With n (> 2) manufacturers for each component, we can imagine a plethora of possibilities to the extent of which the component products are compatible with each other, most of which are analytically intractable. Here, we just consider two polar cases. In the …rst case, which we simply label as compatibility, any component A is compatible with any arbitrary component B to make a feasible system. Under compatibility, n 2 systems are available in the market, which is the the maximum number of varieties that can be assembled by the consumers. This case arises if all manufacturers participate in a standard-setting organization, and establish industry-wide standards that would allow "mix-and-match" between two components from any producers. In the other extreme case of compatibility, which we call incompatibility, a brand of component A can be matched only with the component B by the same producer. 7 Incompatibility among di¤erent systems prevails if the …rms decide to make their components incompatible with their rivals'. Therefore, under incompatibility, only n system goods, the least possible number of varieties, are available to the consumers.
Let us denote the set of component A by I A ; and similarly for B by I B . Also let I C be the set of system goods available in the market, and (i; j) be its generic element where i 2 I A and j 2 I B . The size of I C is n 2 under compatibility, and n under incompatibility.
As in Salop (1979) , we assume that all varieties are symmetrically located, and focus on symmetric equilibria in which …rms independently set the price of their own components, taking the compatibility con…gurations and location choices as given.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the torus. A consumer, who is at (x o
A ; x o B ) and purchases system (i; j) 2 I C , derives net utility of
where v is the reservation value of the ideal system, which is common to all consumers, t > 0 is a "transportation cost" parameter that represents the degree of product di¤erentiation,
x i is the location of …rm i on coordinate A, p A i is the price of component A produced by …rm i, and x j and p B j are de…ned similarly for component B. 8 Each consumer buys at most one unit of the system good that provides the highest net utility. We assume that v is su¢ ciently large, and thus every consumer makes a purchase in any equilibrium. Each …rm's marginal cost is normalized to zero.
Market Equilibrium: Compatibility vs. Incompatibility
In this section, we derive the market equilibrium under compatibility and incompatibility to analyze incentives to achieve industry-wide standardization.
Equilibrium under Compatibility
Under compatibility, competition takes place at the component level. As a consequence, the symmetric equilibrium is identical to that of the one-dimensional circular city model. This can be easily shown by considering an individual consumer's utility maximization problem:
In words, with compatibility that allows every component in A to be combined with any component in B, the choice of each component can be made independently of the other.
Furthermore, each marginal distribution of consumers'preferences is uniform on a circle of length 1, since the preferences for A and B are jointly uniform on the torus. Therefore, provided that the products in I A are equidistant from each other along the (say, horizontal) coordinate x A and those in I B along the (vertical) coordinate x B , there exists a symmetric equilibrium where all …rms in the market set their prices the same and share the market equally.
Note that every symmetric formation of the products on a circle yields the same intensity of competition, which yields the same level of equilibrium pro…ts. As shown in the next subsection, however, this is not the case on the torus: there is usually more than one way to symmetrically locate the products on the torus, and each con…guration yields a di¤erent level of equilibrium pro…ts.
Since the component market B is structurally identical to market A, we just consider the market for component A (horizontal circle) below. Suppose …rm i; located at the origin, charges p A i , and all the other …rms charge the identical price p for their component A. A consumer located at x is indi¤erent between purchasing from …rm i and purchasing from
2 . There are two neighboring …rms on the circle. Thus, the demand for …rm i's component A can be written as 
Di¤erentiating with respect to p A i and imposing the symmetry condition that p A i = p, we derive that the equilibrium price and the pro…t from component A are t=n 2 and t=n 3 , respectively . Since a …rm collects pro…ts from both the A and B markets, the total pro…t is twice as large as the pro…t from a component market.
Proposition 1 Under compatibility, the symmetric equilibrium price and pro…t are given by p C (n) = t=n 2 and C (n) = 2t=n 3 , respectively.
Equilibrium under Incompatibility
Suppose now that each …rm produces the components of a system that are incompatible with the other …rms'products. Since the number of available systems under incompatibility is n as opposed to n 2 (the number under compatibility), and because each …rm supplies a single good (i.e., an integrated system), our model is identical to a two-dimensional circular city model with n identical …rms. In what follows, with a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation for the …rms and the systems that they produce. As mentioned before, we focus on symmetric equilibria, but there is in general more than one way to symmetrically locate the products on the torus. Formally, we de…ne a symmetric formation as a distribution of the feasible systems on the torus, with which given the same system prices, the shape and size of market areas are identical across the systems. Let z n be the set of all symmetric formations for given n, and F n be a generic element of it. Let N i be the set of the neighboring systems of system i, where the neighboring systems are de…ned as follows. In a symmetric equilibrium, j is a neighboring system of i if there exists a set of consumers who are indi¤erent between i and j and purchase either of the systems. In other words, the neighboring systems are direct competitors who share a market boundary. As in the circular city model where a …rm has two direct competitors, in our torus city model, a system competes directly against neighboring systems.
To characterize the equilibrium price and pro…t for any symmetric formation F n , let us introduce a few more de…nitions. Let m(i; j; F n ) denote the length of the equilibrium market boundary between system i and its neighboring system j, and let d(i; j; F n ) be the Euclidean distance between these two systems on the torus under symmetric formation F n .
Using this notation, we de…ne the m-to-d ratio, (F n ) for an arbitrary …rm i,
which is the sum of the ratios of two orthogonal segments (see the left panel of Figure 2 ).
The following proposition shows how this ratio relates to the equilibrium prices and pro…ts.
Proposition 2 Given a symmetric formation F n , the unique symmetric equilibrium price and the corresponding pro…t under incompatibility are given by p IN (F n ) = 2t=[n (F n )] and
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note …rst of all that the equilibrium price depends on the locational formation of the competing products on the torus. More speci…cally, the proposition shows that the intensity of price competition in the market is completely characterized by and is inversely related to the m-to-d ratio (F n ) and the number of …rms n. Intuitively, the market boundary m(i; j; F n ) represents the measure of marginal consumers who would respond to a small price change, meaning that a higher m(i; j; F n ) would lead the …rms to engage in more intense price competition. On the other hand, the distance d(i; j; F n ) captures the extent of product di¤erentiation between the two competing systems i and j. The farther the two systems are located, the less substitutable they become. Proposition 2 essentially states that the (symmetric) equilibrium pro…ts increase as the location con…guration induces shorter market boundaries and longer distances from each other. This result generalizes the principle of maximum di¤ erentiation in a one dimensional location model and is consistent with Irmen and Thisse (1998) who show that …rms seek the formation which generates the smallest market boundary. 9 The result can be illustrated with the examples in Figure 2 . The products in the left panel are distributed more evenly over the space, while those in the right panel are concentrated on two horizontal lines. 10 Thus, we expect that the price competition will be less severe, and therefore the equilibrium pro…t will be higher with the formation on the left panel. Proposition 2 con…rms this intuition; the equilibrium pro…t generated from the formation on the left panel is t=112, which is about 35% higher than t=152, the pro…t from the formation on the right.
It is also noteworthy that the m-to-d ratio itself has little to do with the number of …rms n. That is, because the length of a market boundary is scaled by the associated distance between the products, the ratio does not necessarily shrink down to zero as n grows to in…nity. Instead, the ratio depends crucially on the shape of the market area; when the systems are distributed more evenly over the product space, the shape of each market area becomes more round, as we can see again in Figure 2 . We can predict that when the shape of equilibrium market areas is more round, its m-to-d ratio is lower, and thus the equilibrium pro…t will be higher. 11 Since the equilibrium pro…t depends on the locational con…guration, unlike in the case 9 They state that "the lower the density of marginal consumers, the lower is the elasticity. Accordingly, as the consumer distribution is uniform, demand has minimal elasticity when the corresponding hyperplane has minimal surface area." 1 0 Note again that the top and the bottom boundaries represent the same line in the torus. 1 1 If, hypothetically, the shape of the market area is completely round (i.e. a disk), its m-to-d ratio would be its circumference over its diameter, which must be approximately 3.141592. of compatibility, it is inevitable to search for the pro…t-maximizing formations for each n.
As one can imagine, however, …nding the pro…t-maximizing formation among all symmetric formations is by no means easy. So, instead of characterizing the exact maximum of equilibrium pro…ts for each n, we construct an upper bound on the minimum m-to-d ratios for an arbitrary n. This upper bound will later be used to establish that for n 4, under incompatibility there exists at least one formation that allows a pro…t higher than the equilibrium pro…t under compatibility.
To derive an upper bound for the minimum m-to-d ratios for a general n, we …rst introduce a class of simple and tractable formations. Given n, the k-jump formation, denoted by J k n , is the formation in which every system product lies equidistantly on the line of slope k (with intercept zero) for some integer k (see the left panel of Figure 3 ). 12 It is noteworthy that the examples in Figure 2 are k-jump formations with n = 8 and k = 3 and 4; respectively. A k-jump formation is well de…ned for any n and k, and is tractable because it is repetitive. Note that there are formations which are symmetric but not k-jump. The right panel of Figure 3 provides such an example. To make a contrast between k-jump formations and the one in the right panel of Figure 3 , we introduce another de…nition that helps categorize the shape of market areas. Suppose that all …rms charge the same price while the market 1 2 When k is a rational number, a formation can be de…ned in a similar way. But we do not consider such a case here. If k is an irrational number, the line with slope of k never goes back to an integer point. Thus, there does not exist a regularly symmetric formation in which systems are located on a line with slope of an irrational number. The candidates for neighboring systems of the system at the origin in k-jump formation for k 2; q is the quotient of the division of n by k, and r is the remainder, i.e., n = qk + r.
is fully covered. A regularly symmetric formation is a symmetric formation in which (i) the number of the market boundaries of each system is an even number, and (ii) for any parallel market boundaries of a system, the distance from a market boundary to the system is the same as the distance from any other boundary to the system. In other words, a regularly symmetric formation has each system locate at the center of its market area. Then, it is apparent that the formation depicted in the right panel of Figure 3 is an example of a symmetric but not regularly symmetric formation. Below, we focus on regularly symmetric formations, and let F n denote the pro…t-maximizing formation among regularly symmetric ones. 13 The following lemma states some useful facts about k-jump formations.
Lemma 1 For any natural number k, the following are true:
(i) k-jump formations are regularly symmetric.
(ii) With a k-jump formation, the shape of an equilibrium market area is either a rectangle or a hexagon.
Proof. See the Appendix
Note that there exist regularly symmetric formations that are not k-jump. For instance, consider a formation where each system is located at the nodes of a square grid. This formation is well de…ned for any square number n, i.e., n = a 2 for some integer a 2, and is not a k-jump formation because there does not exist a single line on which all products are located. This, together with the lemma, implies that the set of k-jump formations is a subset of that of regularly symmetric formations in general, and thus k-jump formations do not help us characterize a lower bound of the m-to-d ratio. But it can still help provide an upper bound of the minimum m-to-d ratio. Speci…cally, we construct an upper bound of the minimum m-to-d ratio by considering k-jump formations, with k the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to p n.
Lemma 2 For any n 2, the m-to-d ratio of the pro…t-maximizing formation (F n ) must be smaller than 3 p 13.
Comparison between the Regimes
In this section, we compare equilibrium pro…ts under compatibility and incompatibility. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) show that the pro…ts under compatibility are higher than those under incompatibility when n = 2. 14 However, we show that their conclusion is overturned when n 4.
The upper bound established in Lemma 2 is simply too loose to allow us to show that the equilibrium pro…ts under incompatibility are greater than those under compatibility.
But as shown in Propositions 1 and 2, the equilibrium pro…t under compatibility converges to zero at a rate of n 3 while the rate of convergence under incompatibility is n 2 , provided that (F n ) is bounded above. Therefore, incompatibility must be preferred by the …rms for su¢ ciently large n. It turns out that such n is not very large. Figure 5 shows the increasing trend of IN (J k n )= C (n) where J k n is the pro…t-maximizing formation among all k-jump formations. In Matutes and Regibeau (1988) , the main di¤erence between compatibility and incompatibility in terms of price competition is the degree to which …rms can appropriate the bene…t of a price reduction; a reduction in the price of component A produced by …rm i will increase the market share not only of the system produced by …rm i; but also of the system of component A produced by …rm i and component B produced by its rival. In contrast, under incompatibility the bene…t of a price cut is fully captured by the …rm. Therefore, price competition is more intense under incompatibility, so …rms prefer compatibility to incompatibility. In our model, another e¤ect of compatibility con…guration on the intensity of price competition, namely product di¤erentiation, emerges. More systems are feasible under compatibility (n 2 ) than under incompatibility (n), which makes the market more crowded and the systems less di¤erentiated from each other. This e¤ect grows larger as the number of …rms increases, and eventually dominates the e¤ect demonstrated by Matutes and Regibeau. 15 The discussion so far suggests that incompatibility, which provides the smallest number of varieties, is most likely to be the pro…t-maximizing compatibility con…guration among all possible compatibility regimes, including the ones not considered in this paper. This is because as more systems are added to the market, a system is likely to encounter more neighbors (i.e., directly competing systems) at nearer locations. In contrast, compatibility can be regarded as the welfare-maximizing form of compatibility when the number of …rms is …xed: given the assumption that every consumer purchases a system good, the social welfare is completely determined by the total "transportation costs," which is minimized when the number of available systems is maximized.
Vertically Separated Producers
Section 3 showed that for n large enough (i.e., n 4), incompatibility yields higher equilibrium pro…ts than compatibility when each …rm produces both component A and component
B.
In this section, we consider an alternative market structure, following Matutes and Regibeau (1988), in which each component producer is an independent entity, and show that the main result derived above still holds in this alternative market structure. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) analyze compatibility incentives for two di¤erent market structures. In one case, as in the model considered so far, a component A producer is vertically integrated with a component B producer from the beginning. In the other case, each component producer is assumed to be an independent entity, and has to form 1 5 It is worth mentioning that for n = 2, our model generates the same result as in Matutes and Regibeau (1988), i.e., the equilibrium pro…t under compatibility is twice as large as that under incompatibility:
When the market is served by vertically separated producers as assumed in Section 4, the …rms earn the identical pro…ts (t=8) under both regimes, which is also the case in Matutes and Regibeau (1988) .
an alliance with a partner company to make their products compatible. The integrated system providers set their component prices to maximize the pro…ts from both components, internalizing the e¤ect of a price change in one component on the sales of the other. In contrast, the vertically separated component providers do not internalize such externalities.
As explained at the end of the previous section, an important e¤ect of compatibility con…guration is its e¤ect on the degree of internalization of price externalities. This e¤ect, however, is absent in a market with independent component producers because the …rms do not internalize the externalities under both compatibility and incompatibility. Thus, it is not surprising that the key result in Section 3 reappears in a stronger form.
Proposition 4 Suppose both components of the system are provided by vertically independent …rms. Then, for any n 3, there exists at least one symmetric formation under incompatibility, which allows higher equilibrium pro…ts than those under compatibility.
This proposition is immediate from noticing that individual …rms'…rst order conditions are mathematically identical to the ones derived in the previous analysis. This implies that the equilibrium component price under incompatibility is the same as the equilibrium system price with integrated producers, whereas the prices remain the same under compatibility. As a result, the system price under incompatibility is doubled due to the change in the vertical structure. This is because under incompatibility each component producer ignores the e¤ect of its price cut on the partner …rm's demand, which results in double marginalization of system prices. However, this is bene…cial to producers in competitive environments because it relaxes price competition as in Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine private and social incentives for compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model of system markets. We show that there is a fundamental discrepancy between private and social incentives towards compatibility among di¤erent vendors.
Consumers …nd compatibility more attractive because it allows more variety of systems, and they can easily …nd a system close to their ideal speci…cation on average. However, the availability of more variety under compatibility implies intensi…ed competition and a lower pro…t for every …rm in the market. If the number of …rms in a system market is …xed, then …rms prefer incompatibility to compatibility. However, social welfare is higher under compatibility. 16 We have not explicitly considered any costs involved in achieving a particular form of compatibility. If there are di¤erences in such costs across regimes, the attractiveness of each regime would change in a predictable way. However, it is not clear a priori which type of compatibility would be more costly. In cases where the cost of forming an exclusive coalition (e.g., transaction costs involved in signing a contract) is non-negligibly higher than the cost of establishing standards that would ensure interoperability across all manufacturers, the …rms may …nd compatibility more attractive. However, in other cases the cost of achieving compatibility may be higher than that of incompatibility. 17 One shortcoming of our paper is that we consider only two possible compatibility regimes: compatibility and incompatibility. For the case of incompatibility, we have not considered each …rm's incentive to deviate and build an alliance with another …rm. Suppose that every …rm in the market decides to make their components incompatible with its rivals'products. Firm i may then have an incentive to approach j and o¤er to build a new system (i; j) by making their components compatible. If …rm j accepts the o¤er, now there are two feasible systems in the market whose component A is made by …rm i. Even though the …rm i may earn a smaller pro…t from its own integrated system (i; i), the loss may be more than made up by an additional source of revenue from system (i; j). A full analysis of endogenous formation of coalitions that account for externalities among coalitions in our model would be an important research agenda. 18 In addition, an industry may be partially compatible, or compatibility may run in only one direction in that some …rms'component products can be used in combination with the rival …rms', but not the other way around.
For instance, Windows OS can be used in Mac computers which allows for dual booting, but Mac OS may not be used with the PC. This type of situation typically arises when …rms are asymmetrically situated in the presence of network externalities. 19 An analysis of partial or one-way compatibility within a general framework of n …rms is beyond the scope of the current paper, but would be a worthwhile extension.
Proof of Proposition 2. We …rst characterize symmetric …rst order conditions using the m-to-d ratio, and then show that the …rst order condition should be satis…ed in equilibrium.
Suppose that given a symmetric formation F n , …rm i located at (x A i ; x B i ) charges P i for its system good while the other …rms charge P . When j is an element of N i , a consumer located at (x A ; x B ) is indi¤erent between system (i; i) and (j; j) if
or equivalently,
Note that the above formula describes the market boundary that is orthogonal to the line connecting system i and system j. To see how much the market boundary moves in the direction of coordinate A as a response to a price change in P i , we …rst …x x B . Then, it is clear that a small increase in P i moves the market boundary along coordinate A as much as
. Now, let us de…ne a new coordinate which is orthogonal to the market boundary, and see how much the boundary moves along this new coordinate.
Letting x (i;j) be the projection of x A onto the new coordinate, the following is immediate from the Pythagorean theorem.
Therefore, a small increase in P i moves the market boundary toward its orthogonal direction as much as
.
Next, consider the response of the demand D i (P i ; P ) to a price change P i :
where m (P i ; P ; (i; j)) is the length of the market boundary given the prices (P i ; P ), x (i;j) is the amount that the market boundary moves toward its orthogonal direction, and m (P i ; P ; (i; j))
is the corresponding change in the market boundary. Notice that when the price change is small, the second term in the square bracket is of second order, and converges to zero faster than the …rst-order term in the limit. So by dividing by P i and taking limits on both sides, we obtain the following formula.
On the other hand, the …rst order condition for …rm i is
which can be rewritten after imposing the symmetry condition P i = P = P IN as
The corresponding equilibrium pro…t is
Let us turn our attention to the existence of equilibrium. If …rm i sets P i = 0, its demand D i (P i ; P ) must be positive because P cannot be negative. By continuity of the demand function, for small enough P i the pro…t must be positive. Once again, by the continuity and boundedness of D i (P i ; P ) along with the fact that the pro…t is zero when P i > v, the pro…t function has non-zero maximum with the best response P i (P ) 2 (0; v]. Because all …rms'pro…t functions are identical and continuous, the best response correspondences are continuous and symmetric. Therefore, there exists at least one pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that there does not exist a local maximum at which the pro…t function is not di¤erentiable. This implies that the strategy pro…le characterized above is the unique symmetric equilibrium because it is the only symmetric solution of the …rst order conditions.
To prove the claim, we show that the demand function is convex in P i . To this end, we …rst prove that the market area is convex, i.e., if consumers located at (x A ; x B ) and (x 0 A ; x 0 B ) purchase system (i; i), then a consumer located at ( x A + (1 )x 0 A ; x B + (1 )x 0 B ) for any 2 [0; 1] also purchases the same system. Suppose both consumers at (x A ; x B ) and (x 0 A ; x 0 B ) buy system (i; i). For all (j; j) 2 I C nf(i; i)g, the following inequalities are true.
Rearranging terms, the conditions can be rewritten as
Summing up the above inequalities after multiplying by and (1 ) respectively, we have
which implies that (i; i) is the best choice for any consumer located on the segment connecting (x A ; x B ) and (x 0 A ; x 0 B ). Therefore, the total length of the market boundaries is monotonically decreasing as P i increases. This, in turn, implies the derivative of the demand (@D i (P i ; P )=@P i ) is increasing (see equation (2)) in P i , i.e., the demand function is convex in P i . Note that there does not exist a non-di¤erentiable local maximum of P i D(P i ) if D(P i ) is a convex function. Therefore, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, the …rst order condition derived above should hold.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) By de…nition, there is a line of slope k on which all the products in I C lie. Let us call this line L. In R 2 representation, in…nitely many L's lie equidistantly from each other by the property of (x A ; x B ) (x A + 1; x B ) (x A ; x B + 1). Furthermore, since the systems are distributed regularly on each line, if a product …nds a competing product on one side, it must …nd another on the exactly opposite side. This means that if we draw a line connecting any two systems and beyond, we would encounter a third system, and the distance between the …rst and the second is the same as that between the second and the third. See Figure 4 for a concrete picture.
(ii) By result (i), the shape of a market area generated by a k-jump formation should be either rectangular, hexagonal, octagonal, or 2a-gonal for a 5. We …rst show that it is not possible that a market area is shaped as an octagon. To see this, suppose that there exists (n; k) such that given n, a k-jump formation generates an octagon-shaped market area. Since the market area is convex as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, each interior angle of the octagon must be smaller than 180 . Thus, three or more vertices are required to complete one 360 . In addition, in tiling the torus (R 2 plane), each vertex of the octagon should participate only once, and all together eight vertices should make three complete 360 because the sum of the interior angles is 180 (8 2) = 1080 = 360 3. However, it is easy to see that when we divide the eight vertices into three disjoint sets, there is always a set which has only two or less elements. This contradicts the condition that each interior angle is smaller than 180 . By the same token, for a 5, one can check that 2a vertices cannot be distributed into a 1 disjoint sets without allowing at least one set to have two or less elements.
Proof of Lemma 2. We characterize an upper bound of (F n ) using a k-jump formation.
Note that when n is larger than or equal to 4, in any k-jump formation with k 2, eight Figure 4 . In this case, q = k o and r = n k 2 o .) Thus, the distance between i and a neighboring system of i cannot be larger than p (k o + 1) 2 + k 2 o =n, which is the distance between the origin and (k o + 1) st system when k o = p n. At the same time, it cannot be smaller than k o =n, which is the distance from the origin to the k th o system when k o = p n.
For any rectangle, the longest distance between two edges is equal to the length of the longest edge. For any hexagon, the longest distance between two edges is longer than or equal to the longest edge by the triangle inequality. In other words, every market boundary competition is not a¤ected by the vertical structure of the industry, meaning that the pro…t for a component producer is half of that for an integrated system producer.
In short, under incompatibility each component producer earns as much as IN (F n ), whereas under compatibility they earn C (n)=2. When n = 3, the maximum pro…t under incompatibility is IN (J 1 3 ) = IN (J 2 3 ) = t=18, and under compatibility C (3)=2 = t=27. Therefore, even for n = 3, there exists a symmetric formation under incompatibility that yields a higher equilibrium pro…t than that under compatibility.
